# These file ensures that privileges to applications that were not
# covered by the evaluation are dropped or added. Installed as a .paranoid
# variant, so it only applies while the paranoid profile is active.

# restrict su to users of the trusted group to prevent denial
# of service attacks or password cracking attacks against the root
# password 
/usr/bin/su					root:trusted	4710
# This permission allows the use of targetpw in /etc/sudoers and still
# preventing password cracking attacks from normal users against the root
# password.
/usr/bin/sudo					root:trusted	4710

# 6.2.4.32 Security management roles (FMT_SMR.1)
# users must be able to change their own password
/usr/bin/passwd					root:shadow	4755

# needed for eg screen lock
/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd				root:shadow	4755

/usr/bin/at					root:trusted	4750
/usr/bin/crontab				root:trusted	4750

# screenlock using pam_tally2 bsc#1242913
/usr/bin/vlock					root:root	4755

# guide's "Mounting filesystems" section: ordinary users MUST NOT be able to
# mount filesystems, "enforced by the deletion of the SUID bit on the mount
# command." umount is stripped for the same reason - unmounting is the same
# privilege in reverse, and the guide draws no distinction between the two.
/usr/bin/mount					root:root	0755
/usr/bin/umount					root:root	0755

# fusermount/fusermount3 let an unprivileged user mount a FUSE filesystem of
# their own; not referenced by the guide, but not something this evaluated
# configuration relies on either, so the SUID bit is dropped along with
# mount/umount above rather than left as an unreviewed exception to them.
/usr/bin/fusermount				root:trusted	0755
/usr/bin/fusermount3				root:trusted	0755

# guide's "Removing users" section: group passwords are NOT part of the
# evaluated configuration and MUST NOT be re-enabled. Removing the SUID bit
# keeps gpasswd usable only by root, rather than relying on nobody actually
# invoking it to set one.
/usr/bin/gpasswd				root:shadow	0755

# not referenced by the guide, but not part of what this evaluated
# configuration relies on either; PolicyKit's own privilege-escalation path
# is unused here, so pkexec keeps no more privilege than any other program.
/usr/bin/pkexec					root:root	0755

# not referenced by the guide by name, but not something this evaluated
# configuration relies on either: expiry(1) only exists to let an
# unprivileged caller read their own /etc/shadow expiry fields, a SUID-root
# helper dropped for the same reason as the others above.
/usr/bin/expiry					root:shadow	0755
